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The Diversity of Expertise on Corporate Boards in Australia 
 
 
Abstract: 
Corporate boards are expected to comprise directors possessing an appropriate range 
of expertise. Yet, little is actually known about the expertise that exists on boards. In 
this study, we examine the diversity of professional expertise on corporate boards in 
Australia and implications for shareholder value. We categorize directors by 11 types 
of professional expertise and find the most common types of expertise are business 
executives, accountants, bankers, scientists, lawyers and engineers. We find that 
expertise diversity on boards is primarily related to board size, industry and location. 
Our analysis also suggests that shareholders benefit when firms diversify their board 
expertise within a subset of specialist business expertise (lawyers, accountants, 
consultants, bankers and outside CEOs). Further diversity beyond this subset of 
expertise is associated with lower firm performance and value. 
 
Keywords: board diversity, board of directors, director appointments, professional 
expertise. 
 
JEL codes: G30, G34, J44. 
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1. Introduction 
Board of director composition is an issue that has challenged academics and 
practitioners for decades (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Yet, while guidance has been 
provided to corporate boards on other aspects of board composition, such as director 
independence and gender diversity, little direction has been provided on the types of 
expertise that are expected to be present on boards of directors.
1
 If guidance is 
provided, it simply states that boards are expected to “comprise directors possessing 
an appropriate range of skills and expertise” (ASX, 2010, pg. 19). Since little is 
known about the types of expertise that exist on corporate boards and what an 
appropriate range of expertise may be, this is the focus of this paper. 
 Prior studies of director expertise have generally focused on the existence of a 
particular type of expertise. In Australia, studies have examined the accounting 
expertise and political experience of directors (Aldamen et al., 2012; Christensen et 
al., 2010; Gray et al., 2014). International studies have also investigated the existence 
of legal and banking expertise and experience as an outside CEO (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 2001; Fich, 2005; Guner et al., 2008). To date, Anderson et al. (2011) is the 
only study that examines multiple types of expertise in the same setting. Their 
measures of professional heterogeneity include the existence of lawyers, consultants, 
accountants, bankers and outside CEOs on the board. However, since firms operate in 
a wide range of different industries (mining, pharmaceutical, electronics, banking, 
energy, utilities, and so on) there are likely to be a range of different types of expertise 
on their boards, which have not yet been investigated. 
 In this study, we categorize corporate directors in Australia into 11 
professional expertise groups – academics, accountants, bankers, consultants, doctors, 
                                                 
1 One exception is the requirement of at least one financial expert on audit committees in the United 
States and other jurisdictions.  
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engineers, executives, lawyers, other CEOs, politicians and scientists. This allows us 
to comprehensively analyse the diversity of expertise on corporate boards. Using 
these 11 types of professional expertise, we examine the determinants of the diversity 
of expertise on corporate boards. We expect the diversity of expertise on boards to be 
related to board size and other firm characteristics (firm size, operating performance, 
growth, leverage, board composition and CEO power), the location of the firm (and 
hence the supply of local directors), and to exhibit some clustering of certain types of 
professional expertise in specific industries (Anderson et al., 2011; Knyazeva et al., 
2013).  
In addition, to determine whether professional expertise diversity is in the best 
interests of shareholders, we use cross-sectional analysis and an event study of new 
director appointments to relate expertise diversity to firm value. There are arguments 
both for and against increased board diversity. Prior studies argue that boards 
comprising directors from different business and socioeconomic backgrounds bring 
different perspectives to their monitoring and advising duties that can provide benefits 
to shareholders through improved resource utilization, problem solving and strategy 
formulation (Jensen, 1993; Klein, 1998; Williams and O’Reilly, 1998). However, 
other studies argue that directors from different backgrounds can create conflicts in 
the boardroom and slow down decision making (Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009; 
Putnam, 2007). Which of these perspectives is more relevant to expertise diversity is 
unknown. 
Our analysis indicates that the most common types of professional expertise 
on corporate boards in Australia are business executives, accountants, bankers, 
scientists, lawyers and engineers. We find that some types of professional expertise 
are clustered in certain industries – bankers (financial), scientists (materials, energy 
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and health care), engineers (materials, energy and industrials) and academics and 
doctors (health care) – whereas other types of expertise are prevalent across all 
industries (accountants, bankers, executives and lawyers). Overall, the primary 
determinants of expertise diversity on the board are board size, industry and location.  
In both our cross-sectional and event study analysis, we find no overall 
relationship between expertise diversity and firm value. However, we find evidence 
that shareholders benefit when firms limit their board diversity to a subset of 
specialist business expertise. That is, shareholders react positively when directors 
bring new legal, accounting, consulting, banking and outside CEO expertise to the 
board. Further diversity beyond this subset of expertise is associated with lower firm 
performance and value. 
 This research extends the existing literature in a number of ways. In Australia, 
prior studies have examined the independence, gender, financial expertise, political 
connections, experience and interlocking directorships of corporate directors (Adams 
et al., 2011; Aldamen et al., 2012; Balatbat et al., 2004; Chapple and Humphrey, 
2014; Christensen et al., 2010; Cotter and Silvester, 2003; Gray and Nowland, 2013; 
Gray et al., 2014; Kiel and Nicholson, 2006; Wang and Oliver, 2009). This study adds 
to this literature by being the first to take a comprehensive look at the diversity of 
expertise that exists on corporate boards in Australia and the relationship between 
expertise diversity and firm value. From an international perspective, we extend the 
work of Anderson et al. (2011) by being the first to categorize all directors on the 
board, rather than a subset of directors, by their type of professional expertise. We 
find that the relationship between expertise diversity and firm value depends on the 
types of expertise included in the diversity measure. 
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For practitioners, this study provides useful information about the diversity of 
expertise that exists on corporate boards in Australia. Recent changes to the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations require companies to spend more time and effort examining the 
skills and expertise present on their boards to help identify any gaps in the collective 
skills of the board.
2
 This study provides boards with vital information to help with this 
task. 
 
2. Literature review 
Prior studies of board diversity show that there are both potential benefits and costs of 
heterogeneous boards. Klein (1998) proposes that directors from different business 
and socioeconomic backgrounds provide managers with a broader knowledge base 
relative to directors from more homogeneous backgrounds. Jensen (1993) argues that 
heterogeneous boards bring different perspectives to their monitoring and advising 
duties that can provide benefits to shareholders through improved resource utilization, 
problem solving and strategy formulation. Williams and O’Reilly (1998) add that 
greater diversity brings greater resources to problem solving and increases the 
competitiveness of organizations. In addition, Kandel and Lazear (1992) suggest that 
greater diversity increases mutual monitoring, which results in less free-riding 
behaviour.  
 However, it is also possible that differences in opinion due to the presence of 
directors with different backgrounds and expertise can create conflicts in the 
boardroom and slow down decision making (Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009). Putnam 
                                                 
2 The Third version of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations was released 
in March 2014 and is effective for financial years starting from 1 July 2014. Recommendation 2.2 
covers the skills and expertise of the board. This guidance was changed from commentary to a specific 
recommendation in this version.  
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(2007) argues that greater diversity decreases cooperation, impedes communication 
and leads to social loafing. Other studies also show that diversity increases the costs 
of communication and results in higher team member turnover (Lang, 1986; Arrow, 
1998). Therefore, it is unclear whether more or less diversity on the board is in the 
best interests of shareholders. 
 Board diversity can be measured from a number of different perspectives – 
gender, ethnicity, age, experience, education and professional expertise.
3
 In recent 
work, Carter et al. (2003) find positive relationships between gender and ethnic 
diversity and firm value. Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) and Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) also find that gender diversity has a positive effect on firm value and board 
effectiveness. However, Farrell and Hersch (2005) and Chapple and Humphrey 
(2014) find that gender diversity is not significantly related to stock market 
performance. Ali et al. (2013) find that age and gender diversity exhibit non-linear 
relationships with firm performance. To date, Anderson et al. (2011) provides the 
most comprehensive analysis of board diversity by examining both the social 
heterogeneity (age, gender and ethnicity) and occupational heterogeneity (education, 
expertise and experience) of boards of directors. They find that greater board 
heterogeneity, including overall heterogeneity and both social and occupational 
heterogeneity, is associated with higher firm performance.  
 With respect to the professional expertise of directors, prior studies have 
generally focused on the existence of a specific type of professional expertise. Studies 
in Australia and overseas have investigated the role of accounting expertise on audit 
committees (Aldamen et al., 2012; Christensen et al., 2010; DeFond et al., 2005). 
                                                 
3 This is not a complete list of measures of diversity. Recent studies also examine variation in the 
industry experience (e.g. Das et al., 2011; Faleye et al., 2012; Knyazeva et al., 2012; Masulis et al., 
2012b; von Meyerinck et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2013) and the nationality of directors (Masulis et al., 
2012a).  
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Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) examine directors with backgrounds in law and politics 
and find that they are more prevalent on the boards of firms for which politics matters 
more. Guner et al. (2008) examine the role played by directors with banking expertise 
and show that firms that hire bankers to their boards subsequently increase their use of 
debt capital. Similarly, Fich (2005) examines directors with CEO experience and 
shows that appointment announcement returns are higher for directors with expertise 
as a CEO of another listed company. 
 Thus far, Anderson et al. (2011) is the only study that examines multiple types 
of professional expertise in the same setting. Their measures of professional 
heterogeneity include the existence of lawyers, consultants, accountants, bankers and 
outside CEOs on the board. We extend their work by categorizing directors into 11 
professional expertise groups – academics, accountants, bankers, consultants, doctors, 
engineers, executives, lawyers, other CEOs, politicians and scientists. While most of 
these professional expertise groups have been the subject of prior work, we are the 
first to specifically document the existence of directors with expertise as scientists, 
engineers and medical doctors, and we are the first to examine such a large number of 
types of expertise in the same setting. In essence, this is the first study to categorize 
all directors on the board, rather than a subset of directors, by their type of 
professional expertise, which substantially reduces the possibility of omitted variable 
bias. 
 In this study, we examine the prevalence of different types of professional 
expertise on corporate boards, the determinants of expertise diversity on corporate 
boards, and the relationship between expertise diversity and firm value. We expect the 
diversity of expertise on corporate boards to be determined by a number of factors – 
firm, board, industry and location. In particular, we expect a positive relationship 
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between board size and diversity, as the greater the number of positions on the board, 
the more likely the board will have space to appoint directors with different types of 
expertise. We also expect strong industry effects for certain types of expertise. For 
example, while scientists, engineers and doctors may exist on the boards of all firms, 
they are most likely to be concentrated in specific industries where their expertise is 
most relevant, e.g. mining, energy and health care industries. Since Knyazeva et al. 
(2013) show that the supply of directors is heavily dependent on location, we also 
expect the types of professional expertise on boards to be related to the location of the 
company. Following Anderson et al. (2011) we also examine relationships between 
diversity and firm size, operating performance, growth, leverage, board composition 
(independence, gender and outside directorships) and CEO power (duality).   
To determine whether shareholders benefit from higher or lower professional 
expertise diversity on the board, we relate expertise diversity to firm value in two 
settings – cross-sectional analysis and an event study of new director appointments. 
Shareholders can benefit from professional expertise diversity if directors from 
different professional backgrounds bring a broader base of knowledge, a greater range 
of perspectives and a larger collection of problem solving abilities to their monitoring 
and advising duties (Jensen, 1993; Klein, 1998; Williams and O’Reilly, 1998). 
However, it is also possible that directors from different professional backgrounds 
find it harder to communicate effectively with each other, resulting in reduced 
cooperation, greater conflict and slower decision making (Baranchuk and Dybvig, 
2009; Putnam, 2007). If the net benefits of professional expertise diversity on the 
board outweigh the costs, we expect a positive relationship between expertise 
diversity and firm value.  
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3. Professional expertise on corporate boards 
To examine the types of professional expertise on corporate boards, we use a sample 
of ASX-listed companies. In Australia, section 300 of the Corporations Act 2001 and 
ASX listing requirements mandate companies to disclose the skills, qualifications, 
experience and expertise relevant to the position of director held by each director in 
office. This information from director biographies in annual reports, along with 
supplementary internet searches, allows us to classify each director by their type of 
professional expertise. Our sample initially comprises all directors and firms available 
from the Boardroom database from Connect4 in 2007.
4
 After removing repeat director 
observations, alternate directors and a small number of companies where we could not 
find information on the professional expertise of all board members, our sample 
includes 8,791 directorships in 1,548 ASX-listed companies.
5
 
 All variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Directors with 
experience as a CPA/CA or CFO are classified as Accountants. Bankers are identified 
by their experience in the banking or finance industries. Lawyers have experience as a 
practicing lawyer. Scientists and Engineers are identified as having stated experience 
in science and engineering, respectively. Consultants are management, marketing, IT 
or industry-specific consultants (not accounting, finance or legal consultants). 
Politicians have prior experience in political office. Other CEOs are directors who are 
current CEOs of other listed companies. Academics hold a university appointment. 
Doctors have experience as a practicing medical doctor. Executives are all other 
directors (who have general business experience) that have not been categorized into 
the above expertise groups. Where directors have professional expertise in more than 
                                                 
4 There is no specific reason for selecting the year 2007, except that it was the last year available before 
any potential effects of the financial crisis when we started hand-collecting the professional expertise 
data. 
5  We remove only 13 firms from our analysis because we cannot find professional expertise 
information on one or more directors on their boards.    
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one area, they are classified by their primary expertise. Examples of these expertise 
classifications are provided in Table 1.
6
  
   Table 2 provides details of the directorships held by directors with each type 
of professional expertise. Out of a total of 8,791 directorships, 4,077 are held by 
executives, 1,465 by accountants, 1,102 by bankers, 695 by scientists, 620 by lawyers, 
375 by engineers, 161 by consultants, 85 by both politicians and other CEOs, 65 by 
academics and 61 by doctors. The table also shows that a total of 403 directorships are 
held by female directors and 3,378 directorships are held by independent directors.  
 Table 3 shows the percentage of all firms and firms by industry (10 GICS 
industry sectors) with each type of professional expertise on their board. The statistics 
for all firms show that 85.92% of firms have at least one executive on their board, 
64.01% have an accountant, 39.41% have a banker, 33.98% have a lawyer, 29.78% 
have a scientist, 18.67% have an engineer, 9.69% have a consultant, 5.36% have a 
politician, 5.04% have other CEOs, 4.20% have an academic and 3.36% have a 
doctor. The table also shows that there is obvious clustering of some types of 
expertise in certain industries. Bankers are most prevalent in firms in the Financial 
sector. Scientists are most prevalent in firms in the Materials, Energy and Health Care 
industries. Engineers are most prevalent in firms in the Materials, Energy and 
Industrials industries. Academics and doctors are most prevalent in firms in the 
Health Care industry.  
 Table 4 displays average board characteristics for all firms and across 
industries. Significance is shown for industry statistics that are higher (+) or lower (-) 
than all other industries. The average board has 5.68 directors, independence of 
36.64% and 4.05% female representation. The average incidence of Chairman-CEO 
                                                 
6 Professional expertise classifications were undertaken by two research assistants with the authors 
making a final decision on any classifications that were not consistent between the two research 
assistants.  
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duality is 8.40%. The average board is comprised of 44.70% of executives, 17.04% of 
accountants, 12.10% of bankers, 9.42% of scientists, 7.23% of lawyers, 4.51% of 
engineers, 1.88% of consultants, 0.91% of politicians, 0.83% of other CEOs, 0.71% of 
doctors and 0.66% of academics. Overall, the average board has 2.99 types of 
expertise (expertise index of 0.53), but this varies across industries.
7
 There are 
significantly more types of expertise on the boards of firms in the Energy (3.25), 
Materials (3.25) and Health Care (3.18) industries, due to the clustering of scientists, 
engineers, doctors and academics in these industries.  
Figure 1 highlights these differences in professional expertise across industries 
for boards of 10 directors. In the Energy and Materials industries, boards have 
approximately 3 executives, 2 scientists, 2 accountants, 1 engineer, 1 lawyer and 1 
banker. In the Financial sector, boards have approximately 4 bankers, 3 executives, 2 
accountants and 1 lawyer. In the Health Care industry, boards have approximately, 5 
executives, 1 accountant, 1 banker, 1 scientist, 1 doctor and 1 lawyer. In all other 
industries, boards generally have 6 executives, 2 accountants, 1 banker and 1 lawyer. 
 Figure 2 also shows that the number of types of expertise on the board is 
positively related to board size. When there are three directors on the board the 
average number of types of expertise is 2.27. When board size is seven, there is an 
average of 3.26 types of expertise on the board. When board size is eleven, there is an 
average of 3.76 types of expertise on the board. For the largest board of seventeen 
directors, there are 7.00 different types of professional expertise on the board.  
 In summary, this initial analysis highlights three aspects of the professional 
expertise of directors on corporate boards. First, industry is an important determinant 
of the type of expertise present on corporate boards. For example, we find that certain 
                                                 
7 The breakdown of firms by the number of types of expertise is: 1 type of expertise = 5.4% of firms, 2 
= 26.9%, 3 = 39.3%, 4 = 20.8%, 5 = 6.7%, 6 = 0.9% and 7 = 0.06%.  
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types of expertise are clustered in particular industries - bankers (Financial), scientists 
(Materials, Energy and Health Care), engineers (Materials, Energy and Industrials) 
and academics and doctors (Health Care). Second, the number of types of expertise on 
boards is positively related to board size, which suggests that boards are more likely 
to diversify their professional expertise when they have more board seats to fill. 
Third, while certain types of expertise are prevalent across all industries (executives, 
accountants, bankers and lawyers), we also find that less common types of expertise 
are also found in most industries. For example, some firms in the Financial sector 
have scientists, engineers, academics and doctors on their board. This indicates that 
some firms are diversifying the professional expertise on their boards.  
 
4. Expertise diversity and firm value 
In this section, we examine the determinants of professional expertise diversity and 
relate the diversity of expertise on the board to firm value. The cross-sectional sample 
used in this section includes 1,196 ASX-listed firms in 2007 that have director data 
available from the Boardroom database from Connect4 and firm financial data 
available from the Aspect database. Firm financial data includes total assets, return on 
assets, leverage and Tobin’s Q in 2007 and asset growth from 2006 to 2007. The 
financial variables (excluding total assets) are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 
percentiles.  
 Table 5 provides descriptive statistics of this cross-sectional sample. Panel A 
shows that the mean (median) firm has total assets of $2.66 billion ($36 million), 
Tobin’s Q of 2.83 (1.94), return on assets of -9.59% (0.39%), asset growth of 57.13% 
(21.42%) and debt-to-total assets of 0.33 (0.29). Average board size is 5.74, with 
board independence of 38.18%, female representation of 4.01% and 38.97% of 
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directors with other directorships in listed companies. The incidence of Chairman-
CEO duality is 9.28%. The average number of types of expertise on the board is 3.02, 
average expertise index is 0.54 and average industry-adjusted number of expertise is 
1.01. In general, these statistics are similar to those of the previous section.  
 Panel B displays information on the location of the primary registered office 
of the firms in the cross-sectional sample. This information is acquired from the 
corporate directory section of firm annual reports. Most firms are located in the states 
of Western Australia (375), New South Wales (355), Victoria (246), Queensland (114) 
and South Australia (44). Due to the small number of observations from the 
Australian Capital Territory (5), Tasmania (5) and the Northern Territory (1), we treat 
these as a combined group in our analysis. There are also 51 firms with their primary 
registered offices outside of Australia, which we denote as Foreign. Mean t-tests show 
that the average number of types of expertise is significantly higher for firms located 
in Western Australia and outside of Australia, and significantly lower for firms 
located in Victoria. These differences between locations likely reflect differences in 
both the industry composition of firms and the supply of local director expertise.  
 The prior section indicates that the number and types of professional expertise 
on corporate boards differ across industries and by board size. In this section we 
examine these and other determinants of the expertise on corporate boards. We expect 
expertise diversity to be related to board size and other firm characteristics (firm size, 
operating performance, growth, leverage, board composition and CEO power), the 
location of the firm (and hence the supply of local directors), and to differ across 
industries (Anderson et al., 2011; Knyazeva et al., 2013).
8
  
                                                 
8 Kaczmarek at al. (2012) also examine the relationship between nomination committees and board 
diversity. We do not specifically examine nomination committee characteristics in this paper because 
only 305/1,196 (=26%) of firms in our sample have a nomination committee. This means that in at least 
74% of firms the nominating function is undertaken by the whole board.   
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 Table 6 provides the results of our analysis of expertise diversity. To ensure 
the robustness of our analysis, we utilize a number of different measures of expertise 
diversity, including the number of different types of expertise, expertise index and 
industry-adjusted number of expertise. We use Poisson count models when the 
dependent variable is the number of types of expertise and ordinary least squares 
(OLS) models for continuous dependent variables. All models include robust standard 
errors. 
 We find that both the number of types of professional expertise and the 
expertise index are positively related to board size, higher for firms in the Energy, 
Financial, Health Care and Materials industries, and lower for firms located in the 
states of New South Wales and Victoria. The number of types of expertise is also 
positively related to board independence, while the expertise index is positively 
related to firm growth. The results for the industry-adjusted number of expertise are 
similar, except the significance of the industry results are diminished due to the 
industry adjustment. 
 To compare our results to those of Anderson et al. (2011) we separate our 
types of professional expertise into two subsets. The first subset includes the five 
types of specialist business expertise (lawyers, consultants, accountants, bankers and 
other CEOs) covered by Anderson et al. (2011). The second subset includes the 
additional six types of expertise we introduce in this paper.
9
 The general business 
expertise of executives and the specific expertise of scientists, engineers, politicians, 
academics and medical doctors. We find diversity within the first subset of specialist 
business expertise (lawyers, consultants, accountants, bankers and other CEOs) is 
positively related to return on assets, leverage and board size, is higher in the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
9 The results are consistent if we exclude the general business expertise category from this second 
subset. It is included to ensure we include the expertise of all the directors on the board in our analysis.  
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Financial sector and lower in the Industrials sector and in the states of Victoria and 
Queensland. These results are consistent with Anderson et al. (2011) who find that 
their measures of diversity are positively related to firm performance, complexity 
(including leverage) and board size. However, we find that diversity within the second 
subset is negatively related to return on assets and director experience (percentage of 
directors with other directorships in listed companies). It is positively related to board 
size and independence and is higher in the Energy, Health Care, Industrials, Materials 
and Utilities industries and lower in the Financial industry and in the states of New 
South Wales and Victoria. Thus, this analysis suggests that results can differ 
depending on the types of expertise included (or excluded) in the measure of expertise 
diversity.  
  Table 7 examines the relationship between the diversity of expertise on the 
board and firm value. Consistent with prior studies, our measure of firm value is 
Tobin’s Q and control variables include the natural logarithm of total assets, return on 
assets, growth, debt to total assets, board size, board independence, board gender 
diversity, director experience, Chairman-CEO duality and industry identifiers. All 
models include robust standard errors. In the first specification we use OLS to relate 
the number of types of expertise to firm value and find an insignificant relationship. 
In the second specification, we use a two-stage approach (2SLS) to control for 
potential endogeneity between firm value and professional expertise. The first stage is 
the first specification in Table 6 and effectively uses the location variables as 
instrumental variables.
10
 In the second stage we use the predicted values from the first 
stage for the number of types of professional expertise. Using this 2SLS approach, we 
find that the number of types of expertise is insignificantly related to firm value.  
                                                 
10 We believe location is a good instrument as we show that location is significantly related to the 
diversity of professional expertise in both Tables 5 and 6. Location has also been used as a valid 
instrument in prior studies (Anderson et al., 2011; Knyazeva et al., 2013).  
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 In the third and fourth specifications, we repeat our analysis using the 
expertise index and industry-adjusted number of expertise as the measures of 
expertise diversity and continue to find insignificant relationships with firm value. In 
the fifth specification, we follow Ali et al. (2013) and estimate a non-linear 
relationship between the number of types of expertise and firm value and again find 
insignificant results. In the sixth specification we split the number of types of 
expertise into two subsets, with the first subset consistent with the types of specialist 
business expertise covered by Anderson et al. (2011). We find that both subsets of 
expertise diversity are insignificantly related to firm value.  
 We also repeat our analysis using return on assets as an alternative measure of 
firm performance.
11
  In unreported results, we find insignificant relationships between 
expertise diversity and return on assets in the first five specifications in Table 7. For 
the final specification, including the two subsets of expertise diversity, we find a 
negative relationship between the number of other types of expertise (executives, 
scientists, engineers, politicians, academics and doctors) and return on assets, which is 
reported in specification seven.
 
This result suggests that firms perform worse when 
their professional expertise diversity is extended beyond the specialist business 
expertise of lawyers, consultants, accountants, bankers and other CEOs. 
The results of the control variables are consistent with prior studies and 
indicate that firm value is positively related to growth, board independence and 
director experience, and negatively related to firm size, return on assets, leverage and 
the financial sector. Return on assets is positively related to firm size and growth, 
negatively related to leverage and board size, and varies across industries. 
                                                 
11 We also repeat our analysis using Tobin’s Q and return on assets in 2008 instead of 2007, with 
consistent results.  
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In summary, this analysis indicates that there is substantial variation in the 
diversity of expertise across firms, with the primary determinants of expertise 
diversity being board size, industry and location. Overall, we find no cross-sectional 
relationship between expertise diversity on the board and firm value. However, we 
find some evidence that firm performance, in the form of return on assets, is lower if 
firms diversify their board expertise beyond the specialist business expertise of 
lawyers, consultants, accountants, bankers and other CEOs.  
 
5. Director appointments 
In this section, we analyse new director appointments as another setting to examine 
the relationship between professional expertise diversity and firm value. If firms, on 
average, have the optimal mix of expertise on their boards, then the cross-sectional 
analysis in the previous section would not be expected to produce significant results. 
Hence, we now focus on individual director appointments, which allow us to 
investigate how a change in the number and types of expertise on the board is related 
to firm value.  
We access new non-executive director appointments recorded on the 
Boardroom database from Connect4 from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2007. We 
then remove appointments where announcement dates cannot be confirmed on the 
ASX Announcement database, where there are multiple movements (appointments or 
departures) on the same day, where other news is released around the announcement 
date (-1,+1), where stock price data is not available from the Sirca database and where 
financial data is not available from the Aspect database. This leaves our appointment 
sample with 584 observations, all of which are interim appointments (not 
appointments at annual meetings).  
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Consistent with prior sections, we analyze appointment announcements and 
director biographies in annual reports to classify each new appointee and the existing 
directors on the hiring board by their type of professional expertise. Other director and 
hiring board characteristics are collected from the Boardroom database, company 
annual reports and appointment announcements. For all observations, hiring board 
data is adjusted from year-end to the specific date of the appointment to ensure that 
we have data on the hiring board that was in place when the new appointment 
announcement was released to the market. 
The market reaction to new director appointments is measured by cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) around the appointment announcement following the 
standard event study methodology of Dodd and Warner (1983). Market model 
parameters are estimated from 250 trading days to 20 trading days prior to the 
announcement date. We also calculate CARs based on average returns over the 
estimation period and excess returns over the three-day period. The results presented 
are consistent across these three measures. In unreported analysis, we find the mean 
and median three-day CARs (-1,+1) are 0.34% and 0.15%. The mean firm has total 
assets of $2.86 billion, board size of 4.57 directors and the average number of types of 
expertise on the board is 2.71. These statistics for the appointing firms are similar to 
those of the previous sections.  
Table 8 identifies the appointments that bring new expertise to the hiring 
board. A total of 269 appointments bring new expertise, whereas 315 appointments 
reinforce existing expertise on the hiring board. The most common types of new 
expertise to hiring boards are bankers (58), accountants (49), engineers (35) and 
lawyers (27). The most common types of appointments that reinforce existing 
expertise are executives (178), bankers (46), accountants (34) and scientists (24).  
 19 
 In Table 9, we relate the market reaction to new director appointments to a 
dummy variable (New Expertise), which highlights the addition of a new type of 
professional expertise to the hiring board. Based on prior studies, we also control for 
other characteristics of the appointee - gender, independence, number of other 
directorships in listed companies and interlocking directorships; characteristics of the 
hiring firm - firm size, return on assets, market-to-book, thin trading, CEO tenure and 
hiring board independence; and industry and year effects (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Adams et al., 2011; DeFond et al., 2005; Ferris et al., 2003; Fich, 2005; Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006; Gray and Nowland, 2013; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Shivdasani 
and Yermack, 1999). To control for other diversity the appointee may bring to the 
hiring board, we also include dummy variables to indicate when the appointee brings 
a new gender and new degree to the hiring board. In addition, since the market 
reaction is expected to differ between different types of professional expertise, we 
also include dummy variables to isolate the average effect for each type of 
professional expertise. All models include robust standard errors. 
  In the first and second specifications, the coefficient on New Expertise is 
insignificant, which indicates that, on average, the addition of a new type of 
professional expertise to the board is unrelated to firm value. This is consistent with 
our cross-sectional results in the previous section. The results for the control variables 
indicate that the market reaction to the appointment of new directors is higher when 
the appointee is female and has other directorships in listed companies, and for firms 
that are thinly traded. The market reaction is lower when the appointee has 
professional expertise as a doctor. These results are consistent with prior studies 
(Adams et al., 2011; Gray and Nowland, 2013). 
 20 
 In the third specification, we distinguish between the five types of specialist 
business expertise covered by Anderson et al. (2011) and the additional six types of 
professional expertise we introduce in this paper. The coefficient on New Expertise * 
(Lawyers, Consultants, Accountants, Bankers, Other CEOs) indicates that the market 
reaction to directors who bring these new types of specialist business expertise to the 
board is significantly higher than other types of new expertise. In addition, the 
negative coefficient on New Expertise indicates that the average market reaction to the 
appointment of directors with other types of new expertise is negative.  
In summary, our analysis of new director appointments indicates that, on 
average, we find an insignificant market reaction to the addition of new professional 
expertise to the hiring board. This is consistent with our prior analysis and indicates 
that there is no overall relationship between professional expertise diversity and firm 
value. However, we find evidence that shareholders benefit when firms limit their 
board diversity to a subset of specialist business expertise (lawyers, accountants, 
consultants, bankers and other CEOs). Further diversity beyond this subset of 
expertise is associated with lower firm value. 
Our interpretation of these results is that all types of expertise are not equally 
important to boards. On average, the expertise provided by lawyers, accountants, 
consultants, bankers and other CEOs, is valued more by shareholders than other types 
of expertise. This is likely because these types of specialist business expertise are 
more relevant to the monitoring and advising functions performed by corporate 
directors across all firms. While we do not test for these particular outcomes in this 
paper, prior studies document that accounting and legal expertise is associated with 
higher accounting quality, banking expertise helps firms source additional funding 
and outside CEOs (and potentially consultants also) are valuable sources of 
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managerial talent and expertise (DeFond et al., 2005; Fich, 2005; Guner et al., 2008). 
Thus, our results indicate that, in general, boards need to be wary of diversifying their 
expertise beyond these types of specialist business expertise, as diversification into 
other types of expertise is associated with a lower share market reaction and lower 
return on assets.  
 
6. Further analysis 
So far, our analysis has been conducted on all sample firms. However, it is possible 
that our results may differ in different subsamples. For example, having scientists and 
engineers on the boards of firms in certain industries (e.g. energy and materials) may 
be more beneficial than in other industries (e.g. financial). Thus, we repeat our 
analysis relating expertise diversity to firm value using different industry subsamples 
– financial, energy and materials, health care, and all other industries as a group. We 
find that the negative relationship between return on assets and the number of other 
types of expertise is significant for firms in the other industries group (consumer 
staples, consumer discretionary, industrials, information technology, 
telecommunication services and utilities). The positive share market reaction to the 
appointment of directors with specialist business expertise (lawyers, accountants, 
consultants, bankers and other CEOs) is significant in firms in the energy and 
materials industries. Unfortunately, all other results are insignificant, likely due to the 
smaller number of observations.  
We also undertake a number of robustness checks. Since it is possible for 
directors to hold a directorship for less than a full year, we examine the effect of 
partial-year directorships on our analysis. We hand collect the attendance records of 
directors from annual reports in 2007. This reduces our initial sample to a total of 
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7,549 directorships (out of 8,791 directorships) in 1,404 firms (out of 1,548 firms). 
We find that 1,653 out of 7,549 (21.8%) directorships are partial-year directorships 
and this affects 695 out of 1,404 (49.5%) firms. When we weight directorships by the 
proportion of board meetings directors are eligible to attend during the year, we find 
that board size in this sample is reduced from a mean of 5.38 to 4.79 directors.
12
 The 
mean number of types of expertise is reduced from 2.91 to 2.76. However, these 
changes have no material effect on our reported results.  
 Most prior studies of directors only examine the role played by outside (non-
executive) directors. This is particularly the case for U.S. studies as the boards of 
directors of U.S. companies are predominantly comprised of outside directors. 
However, in Australia inside (executive) directors are still prevalent on corporate 
boards. Table 2 shows that 2,675 out of 8,791 (30.4%) directorships are held by 
executive directors. Therefore, in our analysis of the professional expertise on 
corporate boards we have included the expertise of both outside and inside directors 
to obtain an understanding of all of the expertise present on the board.  
 In our analysis of the market reaction to director appointments (Table 9) we 
have presented the results for a subset of the control variables that we have used in 
wider testing. Additional control variables include appointee qualification dummy 
variables (bachelor degree, law degree, MBA degree, other master degree and PhD 
degree), a dummy variable indicating CEO involvement in the appointment process, a 
dummy variable indicating CEO-Chairman duality and variables controlling for the 
professional expertise diversity, qualification diversity and gender diversity of the 
hiring board. Since the coefficients on these variables are all insignificant and do not 
affect the reported results, they are not included in our main analysis.  
                                                 
12 For example, if a director is appointed during the year and is eligible to attend 5 out of 10 board 
meetings then the directorship is weighted at 5/10 = 0.50. If a director resigns during the year and is 
eligible to attend 4 out of 7 board meetings then the directorship is weighted at 4/7 = 0.57.   
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7. Conclusion 
In order to perform their monitoring and advising functions, boards of directors are 
expected to comprise directors possessing an appropriate range of expertise. Yet, little 
is known about the expertise that exists on corporate boards and what an appropriate 
range of expertise may be. In this study, we examine the diversity of professional 
expertise on corporate boards in Australia and implications for shareholder value 
using a hand-collected dataset of directors categorized by 11 types of expertise.  
We find the most common types of professional expertise on corporate boards 
in Australia are business executives, accountants, bankers, scientists, lawyers and 
engineers. Expertise diversity is greater in firms with bigger boards and is dependent 
on firm location and industry. Our results indicate that shareholders benefit when 
firms limit their expertise diversity on the board to directors with legal, accounting, 
consulting, banking and outside CEO expertise. If these types of expertise do not exist 
on the board, our analysis suggests that adding them to the board will benefit 
shareholders. However, further diversity beyond this subset of expertise is associated 
with lower firm performance and value. 
This paper contributes to both the academic literature and practice. From an 
academic perspective, we are the first to examine all types of professional expertise 
on the board, rather than a subset of directors, thus broadening our understanding of 
the heterogeneity of directors on corporate boards. From a practical perspective, this 
study provides vital information to boards to help in the process of identifying any 
gaps that may exist in the skills and expertise on corporate boards. Finally, we 
acknowledge that there are many different ways to categorize and investigate the 
skills and expertise of corporate directors. Thus, we look forward to future studies 
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examining these issues from different perspectives and the types of expertise in more 
depth.  
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 Appendix – Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Academic 
Dummy variable equal to one if the director is classified as an 
academic (current university appointment). 
Accountant 
Dummy variable equal to one if the director is classified as an 
accountant (experience as a CPA/CA or CFO). 
Banker 
Dummy variable equal to one if the if the director is classified as a 
banker (experience in banking or finance industries). 
Consultant 
Dummy variable equal to one if the director is classified as a 
consultant (management, marketing, IT or industry-specific). 
Doctor 
Dummy variable equal to one if the director is classified as a 
medical doctor. 
Engineer 
Dummy variable equal to one if the director is classified as an 
engineer (engineering experience). 
Executive 
Dummy variable equal to one if the director is classified as a general 
executive/businessperson (not classified into another occupation 
group). 
Lawyer 
Dummy variable equal to one if the director is classified as a lawyer 
(experience as a practicing lawyer). 
Other CEO 
Dummy variable equal to one if the director currently the CEO of 
another listed company. 
Politician 
Dummy variable equal to one if the director is classified as a 
politician (previously held a political office) 
Scientist 
Dummy variable equal to one if the director is classified as a 
scientist (experience as a scientist). 
No. Expertise 
The number of different types of professional expertise on the 
board. 
Expertise Index 
1 - Herfindahl index of squared proportions of each type of 
professional expertise on the board. 
Industry Adjusted 
No. Expertise 
The number of different types of professional expertise on the board 
divided by the industry average number of expertise. 
Consumer Discretionary Indicates firms in the GICS Consumer Discretionary sector. 
Consumer Staples Indicates firms in the GICS Consumer Staples sector. 
Energy Indicates firms in the GICS Energy sector. 
Financial Indicates firms in the GICS Financial sector. 
Health Care Indicates firms in the GICS Health Care sector. 
Industrials Indicates firms in the GICS Industrials sector. 
Information Technology Indicates firms in the GICS Information Technology sector. 
Materials Indicates firms in the GICS Materials sector. 
Telecom Services Indicates firms in the GICS Telecommunication Services sector. 
Utilities Indicates firms in the GICS Utilities sector. 
Total Assets Total assets in billions of Australian dollars 
Ln(Total Assets) Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Tobin’s Q 
Market value of equity plus book value of debt all divided by total 
assets. 
Return on Assets Return on assets (winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles). 
Growth 
One-year growth in total assets (winsorized at 1st and 99th 
percentiles). 
Debt to Total Assets 
Total debt divided by total assets (winsorized at 1st and 99th 
percentiles). 
Market-to-Book Market-to-book ratio (winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles). 
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CARs(-1,+1) 
Three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of 
the new director appointment. Market model parameters are 
estimated from 250 trading days to 20 trading days prior to the 
announcement date. 
Thin Trading 
Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is thinly traded (not traded 
every day in the -30,+30 period around the appointment 
announcement) 
Board Size Number of directors on the board. 
% Independent Percentage of independent directors on the board. 
% Females Percentage of female directors on the board. 
% Other Directorships 
Percentage of directors on the board who hold directorships in other 
listed companies. 
Duality 
Dummy variable equal to one if the same person holds the Chairman 
and CEO positions. 
CEO Tenure Tenure of the CEO in years. 
Independent Board Dummy variable equal to one if the board is majority independent. 
WA 
Dummy variable equal to one if the primary registered office of the 
company is located in Western Australia. 
NSW 
Dummy variable equal to one if the primary registered office of the 
company is located in New South Wales. 
VIC 
Dummy variable equal to one if the primary registered office of the 
company is located in Victoria. 
QLD 
Dummy variable equal to one if the primary registered office of the 
company is located in Queensland. 
SA 
Dummy variable equal to one if the primary registered office of the 
company is located in South Australia. 
ACT/TAS/NT 
Dummy variable equal to one if the primary registered office of the 
company is located in the Australia Capital Territory, Tasmania or 
Northern Territory. 
FOREIGN 
Dummy variable equal to one if the primary registered office of the 
company is located outside of Australia. 
Female Dummy variable equal to one if the director is female. 
Independent 
Dummy variable equal to one if the director is classified as an 
independent director. 
Other Directorships Number of directorships in other listed companies. 
Interlocking 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee and a director on the 
hiring board both hold directorships in a common other company. 
New Female 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee is female and the 
hiring board does not contain female directors.  
New Degree 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee brings a new 
qualification to the hiring board. Qualifications are classified into 
PhD, MBA, other Master degree, law degree, other bachelor degree 
and no reported degree holders.   
New Expertise 
Dummy variable equal to one if the appointee brings a new type of 
professional expertise to the hiring board. 
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Figure 1 
Average Number of Directors with Each Type of Expertise across Industries 
(board size = 10) 
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Figure 2 
Board Size and Average Number of Types of Expertise 
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Table 1 – Examples of Professional Expertise 
 
Director Expertise Biography 
Michael Douglas Academic Dr Douglas is Assistant Dean, Professor of 
Biochemistry and Molecular Biology and 
Director of the Office of Technology 
Management at University of Arkansas Medical 
Sciences, Little Rock, Arkansas. 
 
David Lymburn Accountant Mr Lymburn is a Chartered Accountant with 
over 25 years experience in accounting and 
corporate management.  
 
Charles Bright Banker 33 years in investment banking in Australia, 
London and New York.  
 
Leith Beal Consultant Mr Beal is a Mining Tenement Consultant with 
many years experience in the mining industry. 
 
Michael Monsour Doctor Dr Michael Monsour is a Medical Practitioner 
with extensive interests in Queensland medical 
and dental centres. 
 
Tim Hronsky Engineer Mr Hronsky is a Geological Engineer having 
graduated from the Western Australian School of 
Mines with a Degree in Engineering, Majoring in 
Geology. 
 
John DuBois Executive As an IT executive Mr DuBois has extensive 
business management and sales and marketing 
experience across the Asia Pacific Region and 
has worked on a global basis for over 16 years. 
 
Richard Payne Lawyer Mr Payne is a commercial solicitor and the 
principal of the legal firm Richard Payne & 
Associates.  
 
Ashok Jacob Other CEO Mr Jacob is Chief Executive Officer of 
Consolidated Press Holdings Limited (CPH). 
 
Timothy Fischer Politician Leader of the Federal National Party from 1990 
to 1999 and from 1996 to 1999 was Minister for 
Trade and Deputy Prime Minister.  
 
John Williams Scientist Mr Williams has 20 years experience as a 
geologist in Australia and overseas.  
   
 35 
Table 2 – Professional Expertise of Directors 
This table shows the number of directorships classified by type of professional expertise. Statistics are also shown for 
qualifications, gender and independence. The sample includes 1,548 ASX-listed firms in 2007. Variable definitions are provided 
in the Appendix. 
 
 
All 
Directorships 
Non-Executive 
Directorships 
Executive 
Directorships 
Executives 4077 2701 1376 
Accountants 1465 1058   407 
Bankers 1102   822   280 
Scientists   695   356   339 
Lawyers   620   547     73 
Engineers   375   237   138 
Consultants   161   141     20 
Politicians     85     83       2 
Other CEOs     85     71     14 
Academics     65     59      6 
Doctors     61     41    20 
Female   403   315     88 
Independent 3378 3378       0 
n 8791 6116 2675 
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Table 3 – Percentage of Firms with Each Type of Professional Expertise 
This table shows the percentage of all firms and firms by industry with at least one director with the specific type of professional expertise on their board. The sample includes 1,548 ASX-listed firms in 2007. Variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 
 All Firms 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staples 
Energy Financial 
Health 
Care 
Industrials 
Information 
Technology 
Materials 
Telecom 
Services 
Utilities 
Executives 85.92 98.57 100.00 78.06 75.10 97.10 99.42 100.00 76.41 100.00 95.83 
Accountants 64.01 67.86  79.59 65.16 70.36 50.00 58.38  64.15 63.88  54.84 70.83 
Bankers 39.41 30.71  34.69 29.68 81.03 36.23 26.59  32.08 31.11  32.26 41.67 
Lawyers 33.98 39.29  20.41 37.42 38.34 28.99 27.75  26.42 35.70  35.48 33.33 
Scientists 29.78   3.57    4.08 60.65   1.98 28.99   5.78    0.94 62.84    3.23   8.33 
Engineers 18.67   3.57    0.00 32.26   5.14   4.35 21.39    2.83 35.49    6.45 12.50 
Consultants   9.69 14.29    6.12 10.32   6.71 11.59 10.98  13.21   8.77    9.68   0.00 
Politicians   5.36   5.00  10.20   2.58   3.95   5.80 10.40  11.32   3.34    0.00 12.50 
Other CEOs   5.04   6.43    4.08   3.87   5.53   5.80   4.05    2.83   5.01    6.45 12.50 
Academics   4.20   2.86    0.00   4.52   4.35 18.12   2.31    2.83   1.67    6.45   4.17 
Doctors   3.36   0.71    0.00   0.65   1.58 31.16   0.00    0.94   0.42    0.00   0.00 
No. firms 1,548   140   49   155 253 138   173   106  479   31   24 
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Table 4 – Board Characteristics  
This table shows mean board characteristics for all firms and by industry for 1,548 ASX-listed firms in 2007. Notations denote results of mean t-tests as to whether the mean for the particular industry is higher than all 
other industries at the 1% + + +, 5% + + and 10% + levels or lower than all other industries at the 1% - - -, 5% - - and 10% - levels. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 
 All Firms 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staples 
Energy Financial 
Health 
Care 
Industrials 
Information 
Technology 
Materials 
Telecom 
Services 
Utilities 
Board Size   5.68        6.30+ + +       6.59+ + +      5.05- - -      6.03+ + + 5.93        6.17+ + +   5.44    5.14- - -   6.13      6.75+ + 
% Independent 36.64 36.28 30.95 35.50    41.03+ + +    43.06+ + + 37.28 35.04   33.20- - - 39.80 41.72 
% Females   4.05        6.22+ + +   3.16     2.44- -      6.07+ + +      6.46+ + +   3.83   3.80    2.42- - -   3.37   4.24 
Duality   8.40 10.00 12.24   8.39 7.91 6.52   8.67   5.66 8.14 16.13 12.50 
% Executives 44.70      64.04+ + +      68.80+ + +    33.65- - -   29.22- - -    54.72+ + +     64.89+ + +      63.66+ + +   31.72- - -      68.98+ + +    57.96+ + 
% Accountants 17.04 16.56 16.80 18.18    20.06+ + +   11.41- - -   14.25- - 16.54 18.11+ 14.19 17.95 
% Bankers 12.10      5.98
- - -
     6.09
- -
      6.73
- - -
    37.38
+ + +
    7.19
- - -
      5.51
- - -
      6.97
- - -
     8.31
- - -
   6.79   9.46 
% Scientists   9.42      0.74- - -      0.92- - -      20.81+ + +    0.46- - - 7.08      1.38- - -      0.19- - -    20.38+ + +      0.36- - -    3.61- 
% Lawyers   7.23   7.44     3.36- -   8.35  8.42+  5.56-     5.28- -   5.87    8.27+ +   5.94   4.64 
% Engineers   4.51      0.64- - -      0.00- - -       7.93+ + +    0.95- - -     0.68- - -   4.38      0.82- - -      9.19+ + +    1.00-   2.16 
% Consultants   1.88   2.46   1.10   2.20   1.07- - 2.09   1.88   2.80 1.99   1.28   0.00 
% Politicians   0.91   0.58   1.84   0.53 0.68  0.86       1.76+ + +        2.10+ + +   0.59- -   0.00    2.40+ 
% Other CEOs   0.83   0.94   1.09   0.59 0.82 0.87   0.45   0.39 1.04   0.76   1.36 
% Doctors   0.71    0.10-   0.00   0.16- 0.34      6.56+ + +     0.00- -   0.19     0.11- - -   0.00   0.00 
% Academics   0.66   0.49   0.00   0.87 0.61      2.98+ + +    0.22-   0.49     0.28- - -   0.69   0.46 
No. Expertise   2.99      2.73- - -      2.59- - -       3.25+ + + 2.94    3.18+ +      2.67- - -      2.58- - -       3.25+ + +     2.54- -   2.92 
Expertise Index   0.53      0.45- - -      0.43- - -       0.61+ + + 0.53 0.54      0.44- - -      0.44- - -       0.61+ + +      0.42- - -   0.50 
No. firms 1,548   140   49   155 253 138   173   106  479   31   24 
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Table 5 – Descriptive Statistics of Cross-sectional Sample 
This table shows descriptive statistics of firm characteristics in Panel A and average number of types of expertise by firm 
location in Panel B. The sample includes 1,196 ASX-listed firms in 2007 with director data available from the Boardroom 
database from Conect4 and financial data available from the Aspect database. Location data is the primary registered office of 
firms collected from the corporate directory section of annual reports. The locations of ACT, TAS and NT are grouped together 
due to the small number of observations. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Asterisks denote significance of 
mean tests of the number of expertise between the identified location and all other locations at 1% ***, 5% ** and 10% *.  
 
Panel A – Firm Characteristics 
 Mean Median   Min Max Std 
Total Assets (billions)   2.66   0.04      0.00 564.63   26.57 
Tobin’s Q   2.83   1.94      0.01     9.27     2.30 
Return on Assets (%)  -9.59   0.39 -100.00   82.32   30.59 
Growth (%) 57.13 21.42   -94.00 376.00 101.56 
Debt to Total Assets   0.33   0.29      0.00     1.00     0.27 
Board Size   5.74   5.00      3.00   17.00     2.16 
% Independent 38.18 40.00      0.00 100.00   27.26 
% Females   4.01   0.00      0.00   66.67     8.81 
% Other Directorships 38.97 33.33      0.00 100.00   27.58 
Duality   9.28   0.00      0.00 100.00   29.32 
No. Expertise   3.02   3.00      1.00     7.00      1.02 
Expertise Index   0.54   0.58      0.00     0.82      0.18 
Industry Adjusted 
No. Expertise 
  1.01   0.94      0.31     2.35      0.33 
 
Panel B – Location 
 n No. Expertise t-statistic 
WA 375 3.11      2.00** 
NSW 355 2.99 -0.72 
VIC 246 2.87       -2.59*** 
QLD 114 2.95 -0.84 
SA   44 3.05  0.14 
ACT/TAS/NT   11  2.91 -0.37 
FOREIGN   51 3.51        3.48*** 
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Table 6 – Professional Expertise Diversity 
This table shows Poisson count and OLS models. Poisson count models examine the determinants of the number of types of professional expertise. OLS models examine determinants of industry 
adjusted number of expertise and the expertise index. The sample includes 1,196 ASX-listed firms in 2007 with director data available from the Boardroom database from Conect4 and financial data 
available from the Aspect database. Location data is the primary registered office of firms collected from the corporate directory section of annual reports. The locations of ACT, TAS and NT are 
grouped together due to the small number of observations. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics (z-statistics) are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at 1% ***, 5% 
** and 10% *. 
 
 
No.  
Expertise 
Expertise 
 Index 
Industry 
 Adjusted 
No. Expertise 
No. Expertise 
(Lawyers, Consultants, 
 Accountants, Bankers, 
 Other CEOs) 
No. Expertise 
(Other types of 
expertise) 
Intercept 
      0.56*** 
(12.88) 
      0.37*** 
(13.70) 
      0.52*** 
(11.39) 
    -0.17** 
(-2.26) 
  -0.11* 
(-1.90) 
Ln(Total Assets) 
-0.01 
(-1.53) 
-0.01 
(-1.25) 
-0.01 
(-1.36) 
-0.01 
(-0.87) 
-0.01 
(-1.30) 
Return on Assets 
-0.02 
(-0.61) 
-0.02 
(-0.82) 
-0.02 
(-0.63) 
  0.11* 
(1.69) 
    -0.12** 
(-2.53) 
Growth 
0.01 
(1.61) 
    0.01** 
(2.17) 
0.01 
(1.54) 
0.02 
(1.06) 
0.01 
(0.88) 
Debt to Total Assets 
0.02 
(0.45) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.43) 
  0.13* 
(1.86) 
-0.09 
(-1.59) 
Board size 
      0.07*** 
(15.64) 
      0.02*** 
(6.52) 
      0.08*** 
(14.63) 
      0.09*** 
(11.59) 
      0.06*** 
(7.70) 
% Independent 
      0.09*** 
(2.97) 
0.03 
(1.61) 
      0.09*** 
(2.72) 
0.04 
(0.73) 
      0.14*** 
(3.12) 
% Females 
-0.08 
(-0.80) 
-0.04 
(-0.66) 
-0.08 
(-0.78) 
-0.14 
(-0.76) 
-0.06 
(-0.42) 
% Other Directorships 
-0.02 
(-0.65) 
-0.01 
(-0.31) 
-0.02 
(-0.51) 
0.03 
(0.62) 
  -0.08* 
(-1.80) 
Duality 
-0.03 
(-1.05) 
-0.02 
(-1.11) 
-0.03 
(-0.95) 
-0.05 
(-0.94) 
-0.01 
(-0.22) 
Consumer Staples 
-0.04 
(-0.64) 
-0.01 
(-0.11) 
0.01 
(0.20) 
-0.05 
(-0.44) 
-0.03 
(-0.56) 
Energy 
      0.25*** 
(6.24) 
0.16*** 
(6.85) 
  0.08* 
(1.92) 
0.06 
(0.85) 
      0.46*** 
(9.83) 
Financial       0.13*** 0.10*** 0.06       0.27***       -0.14*** 
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(3.22) (4.10) (1.42) (4.49) (-2.37) 
Health Care 
      0.20*** 
(4.49) 
      0.10*** 
(3.59) 
0.05 
(1.04) 
-0.07 
(-0.93) 
      0.48*** 
(8.82) 
Industrials 
-0.02 
(-0.50) 
-0.01 
(-0.53) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
      -0.25*** 
(-3.51) 
      0.23*** 
(5.57) 
Information Technology 
0.02 
(0.43) 
0.01 
(0.31) 
0.08 
(1.59) 
-0.01 
(-0.04) 
0.07 
(1.32) 
Materials 
      0.24*** 
(6.67) 
      0.15*** 
(7.07) 
  0.07* 
(1.93) 
0.03 
(0.48) 
      0.46*** 
(11.46) 
Telecom Services 
-0.07 
(-0.88) 
-0.04 
(-0.98) 
-0.01 
(-0.03) 
-0.13 
(-1.00) 
0.02 
(0.24) 
Utilities 
0.07 
(0.76) 
0.04 
(0.81) 
-0.01 
(-0.05) 
-0.05 
(-0.30) 
    0.21** 
(2.35) 
NSW 
  -0.04* 
(-1.65) 
    -0.03** 
(-2.23) 
  -0.04* 
(-1.64) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
      -0.09*** 
(-2.66) 
VIC 
      -0.08*** 
(-2.91) 
      -0.04*** 
(-2.72) 
      -0.08*** 
(-2.93) 
  -0.08* 
(-1.67) 
  -0.07* 
(-1.87) 
QLD 
-0.04 
(-1.21) 
-0.02 
(-1.24) 
-0.05 
(-1.31) 
  -0.11* 
(-1.68) 
0.03 
(0.62) 
SA 
-0.01 
(-0.15) 
-0.01 
(-0.43) 
-0.01 
(-0.17) 
-0.02 
(-0.22) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
ACT/TAS/NT 
-0.03 
(-0.40) 
-0.03 
(-0.62) 
-0.05 
(-0.56) 
0.09 
(0.69) 
-0.18 
(-1.36) 
FOREIGN 
-0.01 
(-0.28) 
-0.03 
(-1.00) 
-0.01 
(-0.17) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
-0.02 
(-0.38) 
R
2
 0.30 0.19 0.26 0.22 0.30 
n  1196 1196 1196 1196 1196 
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Table 7 – Expertise Diversity and Firm Value  
This table shows OLS and 2SLS regression models, which relate the number of types of professional expertise to firm value.  No. Expertise in the 2SLS specification is the predicted value. The sample includes 1,196 
ASX-listed firms in 2007 with director data available from the Boardroom database from Conect4 and financial data available from the Aspect database. Location data is the primary registered office of firms collected 
from the corporate directory section of annual reports. The locations of ACT, TAS and NT are grouped together due to the small number of observations. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics 
(z-statistics) are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at 1% ***, 5% ** and 10% *. 
 
 Tobin’s Q ROA 
 OLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Intercept 
2.85*** 
(10.38) 
2.16*** 
(3.49) 
2.93*** 
(10.39) 
2.83*** 
(10.27) 
3.17*** 
(6.94) 
2.83*** 
(10.23) 
-0.04 
(-1.18) 
No. Expertise 
0.07 
(0.99) 
0.64 
(1.39) 
  
-0.14 
(-0.59) 
  
Expertise Index   
0.01 
(0.01) 
    
Industry Adj. No. Expertise    
0.21 
(1.10) 
   
No. Expertise 2     
0.03 
(0.88) 
  
No. Expertise  
(Lawyers, Consultants, Accountants, Bankers, Other CEOs) 
     
0.04 
(0.51) 
0.01 
(0.67) 
No. Expertise 
(Other types of expertise) 
     
0.11 
(1.18) 
    -0.02** 
(-2.15) 
Ln(Total Assets) 
-0.16*** 
(-3.57) 
-0.14*** 
(-2.99) 
-0.17*** 
(-3.60) 
-0.16*** 
(-3.57) 
-0.16*** 
(-3.55) 
-0.16*** 
(-3.51) 
      0.09*** 
(18.05) 
Return on Assets 
-1.97*** 
(-5.60) 
-1.93*** 
(-5.53) 
-1.97*** 
(-5.61) 
-1.97*** 
(-5.59) 
-1.97*** 
(-5.59) 
-1.96*** 
(-5.58) 
 
Growth 
0.23*** 
(3.98) 
0.21*** 
(3.40) 
0.24*** 
(4.03) 
0.23*** 
(3.98) 
0.23*** 
(3.99) 
0.23*** 
(3.98) 
      0.04*** 
(5.59) 
Debt to Total Assets 
-0.67** 
(-2.29) 
-0.70** 
(-2.41) 
-0.66** 
(-2.28) 
-0.67** 
(-2.28) 
-0.67** 
(-2.30) 
-0.66** 
(-2.26) 
     -0.28*** 
(-7.81) 
Board size 
0.01 
(0.21) 
-0.13 
(-1.12) 
0.02 
(0.70) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
     -0.03*** 
(-6.98) 
% Independent 
0.40* 
(1.72) 
0.25 
(0.96) 
0.42* 
(1.79) 
0.40* 
(1.71) 
0.40* 
(1.70) 
0.39* 
(1.67) 
-0.02 
(-0.61) 
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% Females 
-0.05 
(-0.08) 
0.12 
(0.17) 
-0.08 
(-0.11) 
-0.06 
(-0.09) 
-0.05 
(-0.08) 
-0.05 
(-0.07) 
0.12 
(1.38) 
% Other Directorships 
0.47** 
(1.99) 
0.50** 
(2.11) 
0.47** 
(1.98) 
0.47** 
(1.98) 
0.48** 
(2.01) 
0.48** 
(2.03) 
-0.04 
(-1.49) 
Duality 
-0.07 
(-0.36) 
-0.01 
(-0.03) 
-0.07 
(-0.36) 
-0.07 
(-0.35) 
-0.08 
(-0.38) 
-0.07 
(-0.33) 
0.01 
(0.29) 
Consumer Staples 
-0.51 
(-1.60) 
-0.45 
(-1.38) 
-0.51 
(-1.61) 
-0.52 
(-1.63) 
-0.50 
(-1.59) 
-0.51 
(-1.60) 
    -0.09** 
(-2.04) 
Energy 
-0.04 
(-0.12) 
-0.50 
(-1.09) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
-0.04 
(-0.12) 
-0.07 
(-0.22) 
     -0.19*** 
(-6.45) 
Financial 
-0.66*** 
(-2.84) 
-0.88*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.63*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.64*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.66*** 
(-2.85) 
-0.64*** 
(-2.75) 
     -0.07*** 
(-2.90) 
Health Care 
0.29 
(0.87) 
-0.04 
(-0.10) 
0.33 
(0.99) 
0.32 
(0.98) 
0.29 
(0.87) 
0.26 
(0.75) 
     -0.25*** 
(-6.77) 
Industrials 
0.03 
(0.13) 
0.05 
(0.22) 
0.03 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(-0.67) 
Information Technology 
0.42 
(1.23) 
0.39 
(1.14) 
0.43 
(1.24) 
0.41 
(1.19) 
0.42 
(1.22) 
0.42 
(1.22) 
-0.06 
(-1.54) 
Materials 
0.13 
(0.51) 
-0.33 
(-0.75) 
0.18 
(0.71) 
0.16 
(0.67) 
0.12 
(0.49) 
0.09 
(0.38) 
     -0.19*** 
(-6.98) 
Telecom Services 
-0.19 
(-0.40) 
-0.08 
(-0.17) 
-0.20 
(-0.42) 
-0.20 
(-0.42) 
-0.20 
(-0.42) 
-0.20 
(-0.41) 
-0.04 
(-0.49) 
Utilities 
-0.37 
(-0.87) 
-0.48 
(-1.17) 
-0.36 
(-0.85) 
-0.36 
(-0.84) 
-0.37 
(-0.87) 
-0.38 
(-0.91) 
     -0.14*** 
(-4.30) 
R
2
 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.43 
n  1196 1196 1196 1196 1196 1196 1196 
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Table 8 – Appointments and New Expertise 
This table shows appointments that bring new expertise to the hiring board. The sample includes 584 
appointments to ASX-listed firms during 2004-2007 where the appointment is recorded on the 
Boardroom database from Connect4 and is confirmed through ASX announcements, there is no 
other news around the announcement date (-1,+1), financial data is available from Aspect and stock 
price data is available from Sirca. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 
 New Expertise Existing Expertise Total 
Executives 14 178 192 
Bankers 58 46 104 
Accountants 49 34 83 
Engineers 35 17 52 
Scientists 18 24 42 
Lawyers 27 8 35 
Consultants 25 1 26 
Other CEOs 24 2 26 
Politicians 7 3 10 
Academics 10 0 10 
Doctors 2 2 4 
No. appointments 269 315 584 
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Table 9 – Appointment CARs and Expertise Diversity 
Regressions relate CARs (-1,+1) as a percentage (%) to professional expertise, director, firm and industry characteristics. The 
sample includes 584 appointments to ASX-listed firms during 2004-2007 where the appointment is recorded on the Boardroom 
database from Connect4 and is confirmed through ASX announcements, there is no other news around the announcement date (-
1,+1), financial data is available from Aspect and stock price data is available from Sirca. Variable definitions are provided in 
the Appendix. T-statistics are in parentheses. The coefficient on Doctor in the fourth specification is n/a because there are no 
appointments of doctors to firms outside the Health Care industry. Asterisks denote significance at 1% ***, 5% ** and 10% *. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 
-2.13 
(-1.07) 
-1.96 
(-1.04) 
-2.02 
(-1.07) 
New Expertise 
-0.82 
(-1.15) 
-0.58 
(-0.77) 
    -2.75** 
(-2.01) 
New Expertise * (Lawyers, Consultants, 
Accountants, Bankers, Other CEOs) 
  
    3.65** 
(2.34) 
Academic  
0.48 
(0.14) 
2.42 
(0.68) 
Accountant  
0.92 
(0.99) 
-0.08 
(-0.09) 
Banker  
-1.00 
(-1.12) 
-2.07** 
(-2.38) 
Consultant  
-1.75 
(-1.02) 
-3.34* 
(-1.91) 
Doctor  
-14.42** 
(-2.26) 
-13.67** 
(-2.13) 
Engineer  
0.31 
(0.24) 
1.62 
(1.16) 
Lawyer  
-0.14 
(-0.11) 
-1.44 
(-1.14) 
Other CEO  
-2.01 
(-0.99) 
-3.58* 
(-1.71) 
Politician  
-2.77 
(-1.50) 
-1.39 
(-0.62) 
Scientist  
0.58 
(0.37) 
1.38 
(0.84) 
Female 
3.90** 
(2.03) 
3.86** 
(1.98) 
3.94** 
(1.99) 
Independent 
-0.44 
(-0.49) 
-0.52 
(-0.59) 
-0.37 
(-0.42) 
Other Directorships 
0.43* 
(1.81) 
0.47** 
(2.03) 
0.43* 
(1.86) 
Interlocking 
-1.64 
(-1.55) 
-1.69 
(-1.55) 
-1.63 
(-1.56) 
New Female 
-3.08 
(-1.39) 
-2.94 
(-1.33) 
-2.84 
(-1.27) 
New Degree 
0.56 
(0.77) 
0.58 
(0.77) 
0.53 
(0.71) 
Ln(Total Assets) 
0.20 
(1.04) 
0.19 
(1.06) 
0.21 
(1.13) 
Return on Assets 
0.42 
(0.30) 
-0.46 
(-0.33) 
-0.73 
(-0.52) 
Market-to-Book 
0.10 
(0.71) 
0.05 
(0.42) 
0.04 
(0.29) 
Thin Trading 
1.49* 
(1.95) 
1.50** 
(2.02) 
1.55** 
(2.08) 
CEO Tenure 
-0.07 
(-1.20) 
-0.07 
(-1.38) 
-0.08 
(-1.46) 
Independent Board 
-0.25 
(-0.37) 
-0.25 
(-0.37) 
-0.24 
(-0.35) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
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Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.042 0.076 0.084 
n  584 584 584 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
